

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the
Western District of Washington

In the Matter of the Search of

(Briefly describe the property to be searched
or identify the person by name and address)

A Residence, A Person, A Backpack and A Vehicle
More Fully Described in Attachments A-1 to A-4

Case No. MJ21-311

APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT

I, a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government, request a search warrant and state under penalty of perjury that I have reason to believe that on the following person or property (identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location):

A Residence, Person, Backpack and a Vehicle, more fully described in Attachments A-1 to A-4, incorporated herein by reference.

located in the Western District of Washington, there is now concealed (identify the person or describe the property to be seized):

See Attachment B, attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.

The basis for the search under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(c) is (check one or more):

- ☒ evidence of a crime;
☒ contraband, fruits of crime, or other items illegally possessed;
☐ property designed for use, intended for use, or used in committing a crime;
☐ a person to be arrested or a person who is unlawfully restrained.

The search is related to a violation of:

Code Section

Offense Description

21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 846

Distribution, Possession and Conspiracy with Intent to Distribute Controlled Substance

21 U.S.C. § 843(b)

Unlawful Use of U.S. Mails to Facilitate Distribution of Controlled Substances

The application is based on these facts:

- ☒ See Affidavit of USPS Special Agent Casey Snyder, attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.

☐ Delayed notice of _____ days (give exact ending date if more than 30 days: _____) is requested under 18 U.S.C. § 3103a, the basis of which is set forth on the attached sheet.

Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 4.1, this warrant is presented: ☒ by reliable electronic means; or: ☐ telephonically recorded.




Applicant's signature

CASEY J. SNYDER, Special Agent, USPS OIG

Printed name and title

- ☐ The foregoing affidavit was sworn to before me and signed in my presence, or
☒ The above-named agent provided a sworn statement attesting to the truth of the foregoing affidavit by telephone.

Date: 05/26/2021



Judge's signature

City and state: Seattle, Washington

BRIAN A. TSUCHIDA, United States Magistrate Judge

Printed name and title

below, my training and experience includes identifying parcels with characteristics indicative of criminal activity. During my employment with the USPS-OIG, I have participated in many criminal investigations involving suspicious parcels and controlled substances.

INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE OF AFFIDAVIT

3. This affidavit is submitted in support of an application for search warrants for the following location, person, property, and vehicle:

(a) **15103 Southeast Newport Way, Bellevue, Washington 98006** (Herein referred to as the “**SUBJECT PREMISES**”), further described in Attachment A-1, which is incorporated herein by reference; and

(b) The person of **TRI HIEN DUONG**, further described in Attachment A-2, which is incorporated herein by reference; and

(c) The **black backpack** of TRI HIEN DUONG (Herein referred to as the “**BACKPACK**”), further described in Attachment A-3, which is incorporated herein by reference; and

(d) **A red, 2021, Acura RDX, bearing Washington license plate BWP2727; and VIN: 5J8TC2H57ML014595** (Herein referred to as the “**SUBJECT VEHICLE**”), further described in Attachment A-4, which is incorporated herein by reference.

4. For the **SUBJECT PREMISES**, authority to search extends to all parts of the property, including main structure, garage(s), storage structures, outbuildings, and curtilage, and all vehicles, containers, compartments, or safes located on the property, whether locked or not, where the items described in Attachment B (items to be seized) could be found.

5. As set forth below, there is probable cause to believe that the **SUBJECT PREMISES**, the person of TRI DUONG, and the **SUBJECT VEHICLE**, will contain or possess evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute, and distribution of controlled substances, in violation of Title 21,

1 United States Code, Section 841(a). I seek authorization to search and seize the items
2 specified in Attachment B, which is incorporated herein by reference.

3 6. The information contained in this affidavit is based upon knowledge I
4 gained from my investigation, my personal observations, my training and experience, and
5 investigation by other law enforcement officers. Because this affidavit is being submitted
6 for the limited purpose of securing a search warrant, I have not included every fact of
7 which I am aware pertaining to the investigation. I have set forth only those facts that I
8 believe are relevant to determination of probable cause to support the issuance of the
9 requested warrants. When the statements of others are set forth in this affidavit, they are
10 set forth in substance and in part.

11 **THE INVESTIGATION**

12 7. In November of 2020, Investigators with the United States Postal
13 Inspection Service (USPIS) identified multiple parcels being mailed from various
14 locations to Bellevue, Washington. The parcel were Express Mail parcels, paid in cash,
15 and primarily destined to the same Postal Service delivery route. The delivery route was
16 identified as route 83, in Bellevue, Washington. Postal Service records indicated this
17 route was normally delivered by TRI HIEN DUONG. Evidence indicates that DUONG,
18 a Postal Service employee, is using his position with the USPS to traffic controlled
19 substances and/or the proceeds from the sale of controlled substances. The investigation
20 has shown DUONG is receiving parcels on his delivery route, which contain United
21 States currency. He takes these parcels to his home address or other locations instead of
22 delivering them.

23 8. The parcels appeared to be destined to true and deliverable addresses, but to
24 names which were not associated with those addresses. Furthermore, the parcels are
25 regularly mailed from the same city and state, such as Oak Grove, Kentucky; Clarksville,
26 Tennessee; and Atlanta, Georgia. With few exceptions, the Express Mail parcels only
27 arrive on days when DUONG is on duty and delivers mail on route 83.
28

9. Postal Service records show DUONG's address as 16004 Lake Hills Boulevard, Bellevue, Washington, 98008. Physical surveillance and law enforcement records show DUONG resides at 15103 Southeast Newport Way, Bellevue, Washington, 98006 (the **SUBJECT PREMISES**). On January 13, 2021, investigators obtained a federal warrant to track the **SUBJECT VEHICLE**. Data from the tracker affixed to the **SUBJECT VEHICLE**, combined with physical surveillance, has confirmed DUONG's residence to be the **SUBJECT PREMISES**).

10. According to law enforcement records, DUONG is 33 years old, with a prior Washington State conviction for Possession of Controlled Substances with no Prescription (2019). DUONG also had an arrest in 2017 which appeared not to have led to a conviction, for Possession of a Controlled Substance with no Prescription.

11. On December 11, 2020, investigators executed a federal search warrant on Express Mail parcel EJ253292487US, which was mailed from Cadiz, Kentucky to Duong T, 16004 Lake Hills Boulevard, Bellevue, Washington 98008. In obtaining probable cause to search the parcel, investigators utilized a narcotics detection canine, who alerted to the presence of controlled substances, in or on the parcel. This parcel contained \$52,000 in United States currency.

12. On December 22, 2020, investigators conducted surveillance at the **SUBJECT PREMISES**. Multiple vehicles were observed parked at the residence, including those listed below. The vehicle information was obtained from Washington State Department of Licensing records.

- Dark Grey/Silver, 2008, Honda Accord, bearing Washington license plate 944YEH. Registered to DUONG, 16004 Lake Hills Blvd, Bellevue, WA 98008.
- White, 2013, Honda Accord, bearing Washington license plate AXP6315. Registered to My Anh Hai NGUYEN and Truong GIAP, at the **SUBJECT PREMISES**.

- 1 - White, 2018, Lexus IS, bearing Washington license plate BKG6327.
2 Registered to My NGUYEN, at the **SUBJECT PREMISES**.
- 3 - Blue, 2012, Toyota Prius, bearing Washington license plate BKS7412.
4 Registered to Dai TRAN, at the **SUBJECT PREMISES**.

5 13. On December 24, 2020, at approximately 6:00am, investigators surveilled
6 the SUBJECT RESIDENCE. Investigators observed the **SUBJECT VEHICLE** parked
7 at the SUBJECT RESIDENCE.

8 14. On December 31, 2020, investigators conducted surveillance on DUONG.
9 Postal Service records indicated two Express Mail parcels, similar to the parcels
10 described above, were intended for DUONG's delivery route; however, they did not
11 arrive to be delivered. Postal Service records showed DUONG, while on-duty with the
12 Postal Service, drove to the **SUBJECT PREMISES**. Postal Service records confirmed
13 this address is not on the delivery route DUONG was assigned to. DUONG stayed at this
14 location for approximately 17 minutes before returning to his place of work, 13400
15 Southeast 30th Street, Bellevue, Washington 98005.

16 15. On January 7, 2020, investigators conducted surveillance on DUONG as he
17 delivered mail. Postal Service records indicated two Express Mail parcels were destined
18 to DUONG'S delivery route. Both parcels were similar to the parcels described above.
19 With the assistance of covert cameras installed in the delivery vehicle operated by
20 DUONG, investigators observed DUONG bring two Express Mail parcels into his
21 delivery vehicle. At approximately 11:08am, DUONG scanned both parcels as delivered.
22 DUONG was not in the vicinity of the destination addresses when he did so. DUONG
23 then drove, in the Postal Service delivery vehicle, to the **SUBJECT PREMISES**. As
24 DUONG was driving he was observed handling his cellular phone. After arriving at the
25 **SUBJECT PREMISES**, DUONG removed both parcels from the vehicle and walked
26 towards the residence. When he returned to the vehicle, he did not have the parcels.
27 DUONG departed the location and resumed delivering mail.
28

1 16. Later, on January 7, 2021, investigators conducted surveillance on
2 DUONG. DUONG drove the **SUBJECT VEHICLE** directly from work to the
3 **SUBJECT PREMISES**. At the **SUBJECT PREMISES**, investigators observed a white
4 Honda Accord (AXP6315), a white Lexus (BKG6327), and a silver Honda Accord
5 (944YEH). Approximately 15 minutes after arriving at the **SUBJECT PREMISES**,
6 DUONG departed in the **SUBJECT VEHICLE** and drove to 2000 Northeast 16th Street,
7 Renton, Washington. Surveillance was terminated while DUONG was still at this
8 residence.

9 17. On January 12, 2021, investigators conducted surveillance on DUONG.
10 Postal Service records indicated DUONG handled/scanned two Express Mail parcels
11 similar to those described above. Investigators followed DUONG from his delivery route
12 to the **SUBJECT PREMISES**. DUONG exited the delivery vehicle with what appeared
13 to be two Express Mail parcels. DUONG appeared to enter the residence with the
14 parcels. A few minutes later, DUONG exited the **SUBJECT PREMISES** without the
15 parcels, entered the delivery vehicle, and departed. A silver Honda Accord (WA
16 944YEH), a white Honda Accord (WA AXP6315), and a blue Toyota Prius (WA
17 BKS7412); previously observed at the **SUBJECT PREMISES**, were parked at the
18 **SUBJECT PREMISES** when DUONG arrived and after he departed.

19 18. On January 15, 2021, Postal Service records indicated an Express Mail
20 parcel similar to those described above was destined to DUONG's delivery route. Using
21 the covert cameras in DUONG's delivery vehicle, investigators observed DUONG scan
22 the parcel, then handle his cell phone. DUONG then removed the label from the Express
23 Mail parcel and placed the parcel in his backpack. After doing so, DUONG again
24 handled his cell phone.

25 19. On January 25, 2021, Postal Service records indicated two Express Mail
26 parcels, similar to those described above, were destined to DUONG's delivery route.
27 One originated in Kentucky, the other in Tennessee. Using the covert cameras in
28 DUONG's delivery vehicle, investigators were able to observe DUONG scan the parcels

1 as delivered and remove the labels from the parcels. DUONG drove the Postal Service
2 delivery vehicle to the **SUBJECT PREMISES** and exited the vehicle. On the drive to
3 this residence, investigators observed DUONG talking on his cellular phone. DUONG
4 returned to the delivery vehicle and retrieved the two Express Mail parcels, then walked
5 back to the **SUBJECT PREMISES**. DUONG returned to the delivery vehicle without
6 the parcels and immediately began handling his cell phone. DUONG appeared to make a
7 phone call before driving back towards his delivery route and resuming his duties.

8 20. On February 4, 2021, investigators surveilled DUONG, with the assistance
9 of the tracker affixed to the **SUBJECT VEHICLE**. Investigators observed Washington
10 license plate BWP2727 affixed to the **SUBJECT VEHICLE**. Law enforcement records
11 confirmed this vehicle was registered to DUONG at 16004 Lake Hills Boulevard,
12 Bellevue, Washington. Investigators observed DUONG leave work and place a
13 **BACKPACK** in the rear of the **SUBJECT VEHICLE**, similar to the black backpack
14 used previously. That evening, investigators observed DUONG drive the **SUBJECT**
15 **VEHICLE** to 2000 Northeast 16th Street, Renton, Washington. DUONG entered and
16 exited the residence carrying what appeared to be a large dark bag or backpack which he
17 placed in the rear of the **SUBJECT VEHICLE**. DUONG then drove back to the
18 **SUBJECT PREMISES**.

19 21. On February 18, 2021, investigators conducted surveillance on DUONG,
20 with the assistance of the GPS tracker affixed to the **SUBJECT VEHICLE**. DUONG
21 again brought a **BACKPACK** out of the Postal Service facility and placed it in the rear
22 of the **SUBJECT VEHICLE**. DUONG drove to the **SUBJECT PREMISES**, retrieved
23 the backpack from the rear of the **SUBJECT VEHICLE**, and entered the residence.

24 22. On February 26, 2021, Postal Service records indicated two Express Mail
25 parcels, similar to those described above, were destined to DUONG's delivery route.
26 One of these parcels originated in Atlanta, GA, the other in Clarksville, TN. Using the
27 covert cameras in DUONG's delivery vehicle, investigators observed DUONG enter his
28 delivery vehicle with two Express Mail parcels which he scanned as delivered. DUONG

1 handled his cell phone, while driving the Postal Service delivery vehicle to the
2 **SUBJECT PREMISES**. Upon arriving at the **SUBJECT PREMISES**, DUONG took
3 the two Express Mail parcels from the delivery vehicle and walked towards the residence.
4 When DUONG returned to the delivery vehicle, he did not have the parcels.

5 23. On March 9, 2021, Postal Service records indicated an Express Mail parcel,
6 similar to those described above, was destined to DUONG's delivery route. Using the
7 covert cameras in DUONG's delivery vehicle, investigators observed DUONG scan the
8 parcel, then place it in his backpack, within the delivery vehicle. DUONG then grabbed
9 his cell phone and exited the vehicle.

10 24. On March 17, 2021, investigators conducted surveillance on DUONG with
11 the assistance of the GPS tracker affixed to the **SUBJECT VEHICLE**. Postal Service
12 records indicated DUONG was receiving four parcels similar to those described above.
13 Investigators observed DUONG travel to the **SUBJECT PREMISES**, while on duty,
14 after collecting these parcels from the Bellevue Carrier Annex. In the evening of March
15 17, 2021, DUONG drove the **SUBJECT VEHICLE** to 2000 Northeast 16th Street,
16 Renton, Washington. DUONG knocked on the door and waited. He then turned and
17 appeared to speak with someone at the door. DUONG then went to the **SUBJECT**
18 **VEHICLE** and retrieved what appeared to be a white bag with large square objects in it,
19 which he carried into the residence. DUONG exited the residence shortly after, without
20 the bag or its contents and departed in the **SUBJECT VEHICLE**.

21 25. On March 25, 2021, Postal Service records indicated three Express Mail
22 parcels, similar to those described above, were destined to DUONG's delivery route.
23 Using the covert cameras in DUONG's delivery vehicle, investigators observed DUONG
24 drive his delivery vehicle to the **SUBJECT PREMISES**. Duong appeared to carry
25 multiple Express Mail parcels towards the residence. When DUONG returned to the
26 delivery vehicle, he no longer had the parcels. Investigators observed DUONG use his
27 Postal Service scanner to scan something on his cellular phone, multiple times. DUONG
28 then appeared to input information into the scanner from his cellular phone. These scan

1 times and locations match Postal Service records for scans associated with the three
2 Express Mail parcels destined to DUONG's delivery route. Based on my training and
3 experience, I know Postal Service shipping labels contain barcode information on them.
4 Postal Service employees use Postal Service "scanners" to scan these barcodes; in order
5 to update the status of a parcel, such as "delivered" or "Return to Sender". In order for
6 the status of a parcel to be updated, Postal Service employees must either scan this
7 barcode or manually enter the parcel information. For DUONG to be able to update the
8 status of a parcel by scanning his phone, the phone had to contain images or copies of the
9 barcodes and/or the shipping labels from these parcels. Based on this, I believe DUONG
10 was scanning images of shipping labels, maintained on his cell phone. Investigators
11 observed multiple vehicles at the **SUBJECT PREMISES**, including a white Honda
12 Accord (AXP6315) and a white Lexus IS, bearing Washington license plate BKG6327.
13 Law enforcement records showed the white Lexus IS was registered to My NGUYEN at
14 the **SUBJECT PREMISES**.

15 26. On March 30, 2021, Postal Service records indicated two Express Mail
16 parcels, similar to those described above, were destined to DUONG's delivery route.
17 Using the covert cameras in DUONG's delivery vehicle, investigators observed DUONG
18 drive his delivery vehicle to the **SUBJECT PREMISES**. DUONG exited the delivery
19 vehicle and walked towards the residence. After returning to the delivery vehicle,
20 DUONG retrieved his wallet and pulled what appeared to be a credit/debit card from the
21 wallet. DUONG appeared to enter information from the card into his cell phone.
22 DUONG then used the Postal Service scanner to scan something on his cell phone and
23 wrote something on the scanner. Approximately 30 minutes later, DUONG again used
24 the Postal Service scanner to scan something on his cell phone. These scan times and
25 locations match Postal Service records for scans associated with the two Express Mail
26 parcels destined to DUONG's delivery route. Based on my training and experience, I
27 believe DUONG was scanning images of shipping labels, maintained on his cell phone.
28

27. On April 16, 2021, investigators conducted surveillance on DUONG. Postal Service records indicated two Express Mail parcels, similar to those described above, were destined to DUONG's delivery route and residence. The first was Express Mail parcel EJ655332919US, which was mailed from Clarksville, TN to the **SUBJECT PREMISES**. Investigators confirmed this parcel was not addressed to DUONG. Earlier, on April 16, 2021, investigators executed a federal warrant on this parcel and found it to contain \$83,990.00 in U.S. currency. Investigators placed this mail piece back in the mail stream after examination. The second parcel was Express Mail parcel EJ647915820US, which was mailed from Atlanta, GA, to 1660 118th Ave S, Bellevue, WA 98005. This is a deliverable address on DUONG's delivery route.

28. Postal Service records showed both parcels were scanned "Delivered" by DUONG. Using the covert cameras in DUONG's delivery vehicle, investigators observed DUONG shove at least one of the Express Mail parcels into his **BACKPACK**. Later, investigators observed DUONG return to the Bellevue Carrier Annex and exit his delivery vehicle with the backpack. After leaving work, DUONG drove the **SUBJECT VEHICLE** directly from the Bellevue Carrier Annex to 2000 NE 16th St, Renton, WA. Investigators observed DUONG enter this residence with the **BACKPACK**. Approximately 10 minutes later, investigators observed DUONG exit the residence with the same backpack and depart in the **SUBJECT VEHICLE**.

29. On April 22, 2021, investigators conducted surveillance on multiple locations associated to this investigation, including the **SUBJECT PREMISES** and 2000 Northeast 16th Street, Renton, Washington. Postal Service records indicated two parcels associated with this investigation were destined to DUONG's delivery route. Postal Service records indicated DUONG drove his delivery vehicle to the **SUBJECT PREMISES** at approximately 10:13am. Investigators observed a blue Toyota Prius (WA BKS7412), a white Honda Accord (WA AXP6315), and a white Lexus (WA BKG6327) at the **SUBJECT PREMISES**. At approximately 3:58pm, an Asian male, believed to be Dai TRAN loaded something into the trunk of the blue Toyota Prius and departed. At

1 approximately 4:24pm, investigators observed the blue Toyota Prius arrive at 2000
2 Northeast 16th Street, Renton, Washington. TRAN carried a box from the vehicle and
3 waited at the front door. After the door was answered, TRAN carried the box inside.
4 After approximately eight minutes, TRAN exited the residence, carrying the same box.
5 He entered the blue Toyota Prius and departed. Investigators observed the blue Toyota
6 Prius arrive at the **SUBJECT PREMISES** at approximately 7:48pm.

7 30. At approximately 5:40pm, DUONG arrived at the **SUBJECT PREMISES**
8 in the **SUBJECT VEHICLE**. At approximately 7:50pm, investigators observed
9 DUONG exit the **SUBJECT PREMISES** and load what appeared to be a large full black
10 garbage bag and two boxes, which appeared to be Postal Service boxes, into the rear of
11 the **SUBJECT VEHICLE**. TRAN brought DUONG a third box from within the
12 **SUBJECT PREMISES**, which DUONG placed inside the rear of the **SUBJECT**
13 **VEHICLE** before he departed. Investigators followed DUONG to a residence located at
14 2822 South 376th Place, Federal Way, Washington. DUONG backed up to the residence
15 and appeared to unload items from the rear of the **SUBJECT VEHICLE**. After leaving
16 this location, DUONG made a stop in Seattle, Washington before traveling to 2000
17 Northeast 16th Street, Renton, Washington.

18 31. On April 23, 2021, using the covert cameras installed in DUONG's
19 delivery vehicle, investigators observed DUONG rip open two Priority Mail parcels,
20 while delivering mail in Bellevue, Washington. He placed the contents from one of the
21 parcels inside his **BACKPACK** located within his delivery vehicle. DUONG placed the
22 contents he removed from the second parcel within the delivery vehicle; out of the
23 camera's view. At the end of his workday, DUONG collected the **BACKPACK** from
24 the delivery vehicle and left. Data from the GPS affixed to the **SUBJECT VEHICLE**
25 showed DUONG traveled directly from work to the **SUBJECT PREMISES**.
26 Investigators were later able to recover the two parcels DUONG ripped open from a
27 recycling bin. Inspection of the parcels showed they were not intended for DUONG or
28 any address associated to DUONG.

32. On May 19, 2021, Postal Service records indicated two parcels, similar to those described above were intended to DUONG's delivery route. Using the covert cameras installed in DUONG's delivery vehicle, investigators observed DUONG drive to the **SUBJECT PREMISES**. DUONG removed two Express Mail parcels from the delivery vehicle and walked towards the residence. When he returned to the delivery vehicle, he no longer had the parcels. DUONG departed in the delivery vehicle and returned to his delivery route.

TACTICS USED BY DRUG TRAFFICKERS

33. Based on my training and experience, and conversations with other experienced law enforcement agents and officers who have been involved in narcotics cases, I know the following.

34. The distribution of illegal narcotics is frequently a continuing activity lasting over months and years. Persons involved in the trafficking of illegal controlled substances typically will obtain and distribute controlled substances on a regular basis, much as a distributor of a legal commodity would purchase stock for sale. Similarly, such drug traffickers will maintain an "inventory" which will fluctuate in size depending upon the demand for and the available supply of the product. Drug traffickers often keep records of their illegal activities not only during the period of their drug trafficking violations but also for a period of time extending beyond the time during which the trafficker actually possesses/controls illegal controlled substances. The records are kept in order to maintain contact with criminal associates for future transactions and so that the trafficker can have records of prior transactions for which the trafficker might still be owed money or might owe someone else money. Dealers often keep these records in their homes and in vehicles that they own, use, or have access to.

35. It is common for drug traffickers to conceal large quantities of U.S. currency, foreign currency, cryptocurrency, financial instruments, precious metals, jewelry, and other items of value that are proceeds from drug trafficking in their residences and in other storage areas associated with the residence, such as on-site

1 storage lockers, garages, detached storage sheds, and parking stalls, or safes located on
2 the property. Based on my training and experience, I know that cryptocurrency is
3 increasingly being used as a means of payment among members of a drug trafficking
4 conspiracy.

5 36. Evidence of excessive wealth beyond an individual's outward means is
6 probative evidence of the distribution of controlled substances. Therefore, receipts
7 showing the expenditure of large sums of money and/or the expensive assets can be
8 evidence of drug trafficking. Drug traffickers commonly keep the expensive assets
9 themselves and/or documentation of the purchase of the asset (receipts, warranty cards,
10 etc.) in their homes, places of business, and in vehicles that they own, use, or have access
11 to.

12 37. It is common for drug traffickers to maintain equipment and supplies (such
13 as scales, packaging, and masking agents) on hand over a long period, even when they do
14 not have any controlled substances on hand. The aforementioned items are frequently
15 maintained in the drug trafficker's homes, places of business, stash houses, or storage
16 units, and in vehicles that they own, use, or have access to.

17 38. Drug traffickers often have some amount of inventory—namely, illegal
18 drugs—stored in their homes, places of business, stash houses or storage units, and in
19 vehicles that they own, use, or have access to.

20 39. It is common for drug traffickers to possess firearms and ammunition to
21 protect their drugs, assets, and persons from hostile gangs, rival traffickers, other
22 criminals, and from law enforcement. Persons who purchase and possess firearms also
23 tend to maintain the firearms and ammunition for lengthy periods of time. Firearms can
24 be acquired both legally and unlawfully, without official/traceable documentation.
25 Persons who acquire firearms from Federal Firearms Licensees, through deliberate fraud
26 and concealment, often will also acquire firearms from private parties and other sources
27 unknown to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives ("ATF"). Persons
28 who, whether legally or illegally, purchase, possess, sell and/or transfer firearms or

1 ammunition commonly maintain the firearms or ammunition on their person, at their
2 residence or business, or in a motor vehicle which they own and/or operate. Firearms or
3 ammunition are often secreted at other locations within their residential curtilage, and the
4 identification of these firearms will assist in establishing their origin. Persons who
5 purchase, possess, sell and/or trade firearms or ammunition commonly maintain
6 documents and items that are related to the purchase, ownership, possession, sale and/or
7 transfer of firearms, ammunition, and/or firearm parts, including but not limited to
8 driver's licenses, telephone records, telephone bills, address and telephone books,
9 canceled checks, receipts, bank records and other financial documentation on the owner's
10 person, at the owner's residence or business, or in vehicles that they own, use, or have
11 access to. Additionally, these individuals often maintain holsters, spare magazines or
12 speed loaders and other instruments to facilitate the use of firearms in furtherance of
13 criminal activity or acts of violence.

14 40. It is common for members of drug trafficking organizations, in an attempt
15 to disguise their identities and illegal activities, to use prepaid cellular telephones and
16 prepaid long-distance calling cards. Often the only way to connect a subject with a
17 particular prepaid cellular telephone or calling card is to seize the phone or calling card
18 from the trafficker or his residence. The aforementioned items are frequently maintained
19 in the drug trafficker's residence, place of business, or other areas they have access to.

20 41. Drug traffickers often carry many of the items described above—including
21 (but not limited to) drugs, drug proceeds, firearms, cellular phones—on their person.

22 42. Drug dealers regularly use cell phones and other electronic communication
23 devices to further their illegal activities. As a result, evidence of drug dealing can often
24 be found in text messages, address books, call logs, photographs, emails, text messaging
25 or picture messaging applications, videos, and other data that is stored on cell phones and
26 other electronic communication devices. Additionally, the storage capacity of such
27 devices allows them to be used for the electronic maintenance of ledgers, pay/owe logs,
28 drug weights and amounts, customers contact information, not only during the period of

1 their drug trafficking violations but also for a period of time extending beyond the time
2 during which the trafficker actually possesses/controls illegal controlled substances. The
3 records are kept in order to maintain contact with criminal associates for future
4 transactions and so that the trafficker can have records of prior transactions for which the
5 trafficker might still be owed money or might owe someone else money.

6 43. Drug traffickers increasingly use applications on smartphones that encrypt
7 communications such as WhatsApp, or applications that automatically delete messages,
8 such as Snapchat, in order to avoid law enforcement monitoring or recording of
9 communications regarding drug trafficking and/or money laundering. Evidence of the
10 use of such applications can be obtained from smartphones and is evidence of a
11 smartphone user's efforts to avoid law enforcement detection.

12 **SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF DIGITAL MEDIA**

13 44. As described above and in Attachment B, this application seeks permission
14 to search for items listed in Attachment B that might be found in **SUBJECT**
15 **PREMISES**, on DUONG's person, in DUONG's backpack, and in **SUBJECT**
16 **VEHICLE**, including digital devices.

17 45. In order to examine digital media in a forensically sound manner, law
18 enforcement personnel, with appropriate expertise, will conduct a forensic review of any
19 digital media seized. The purpose of using specially trained computer forensic examiners
20 to conduct the imaging of any digital media or digital devices is to ensure the integrity of
21 the evidence and to follow proper, forensically sound, scientific procedures. When the
22 investigative agent is a trained computer forensic examiner, it is not always necessary to
23 separate these duties. Computer forensic examiners and investigators often work closely
24 with investigative personnel to assist investigators in their search for digital evidence.
25 Computer forensic examiners are needed because they generally have technological
26 expertise that investigative agents do not possess. Computer forensic examiners,
27 however, may lack the factual and investigative expertise that an investigate agent may
28 possess. Therefore, computer forensic examiners and agents often work closely together.

1 It is intended that the warrant will provide authority for the affiant to forensically review,
2 or seek the assistance of others in the HSI or within other law enforcement agencies to
3 assist in the forensic review of any digital devices.

4 46. I also know the following:

5 a. Based my knowledge, training, and experience, I know that
6 computer files or remnants of such files may be recovered months or even years after
7 they have been downloaded onto a storage medium, deleted, or viewed via the Internet.
8 Electronic files downloaded to a storage medium can be stored for years at little or no
9 cost. Even when files have been deleted, this information can sometimes be recovered
10 months or years later with forensics tools. This is because when a person “deletes” a file
11 on a computer, the data contained in the files does not actually disappear; rather, that data
12 remains on the storage medium until it is overwritten by new data.

13 b. Therefore, deleted files, or remnants of deleted files, may reside in
14 free space or slack space—that is, in space on the storage medium that is not currently
15 being used by an active file—for long periods of time before they are overwritten. In
16 addition, a computer’s operating system may also keep a record of deleted data in “swap”
17 or “recovery” files.

18 c. Wholly apart from user-generated files, computer storage media—in
19 particular, computers’ internal hard drives—contain electronic evidence of how a
20 computer has been used, what it has been used for, and who has used it. To give a few
21 examples, this forensic evidence can take the form of operating system configurations,
22 artifacts from operating system or application operation, file system data structures, and
23 virtual memory “swap” paging files. Computer users typically do not erase or delete this
24 evidence, because special software is typically required for that task. However, it is
25 technically possible to delete this information.

26 d. Similarly, files that have been viewed via the Internet are sometimes
27 automatically downloaded into a temporary Internet directory or “cache.”
28

1 e. Digital storage devices may also be large in capacity, but small in
2 physical size. Those who are in possession of such devices also tend to keep them on
3 their persons, especially when they may contain evidence of a crime. Digital storage
4 devices may be smaller than a postal stamp in size, and thus they may easily be hidden in
5 a person's pocket.

6 f. As further described in Attachment B, this application seeks
7 permission to locate not only computer files that might serve as direct evidence of the
8 crimes described on the warrant, but also for forensic electronic evidence that establishes
9 how computers were used, the purpose of their use, who used them, and when. There is
10 probable cause to believe that this forensic electronic evidence will be on digital devices
11 found in the **SUBJECT PREMISES**, on DUONG's person, in DUONG's backpack, or
12 in the **SUBJECT VEHICLE**, because:

13 g. Data on the digital storage medium or digital devices can provide
14 evidence of a file that was once on the digital storage medium or digital devices but has
15 since been deleted or edited, or of a deleted portion of a file (such as a paragraph that has
16 been deleted from a word processing file). Virtual memory paging systems can leave
17 traces of information on the storage medium that show what tasks and processes were
18 recently active. Web browsers, e-mail programs, and chat programs store configuration
19 information on the storage medium that can reveal information such as online nicknames
20 and passwords. Operating systems can record additional information, such as the
21 attachment of peripherals, the attachment of USB flash storage devices or other external
22 storage media, and the times the computer was in use. Computer file systems can record
23 information about the dates files were created and the sequence in which they were
24 created, although this information can later be falsified.

25 h. As explained herein, information stored within a computer and other
26 electronic storage media may provide crucial evidence of the "who, what, why, when,
27 where, and how" of the criminal conduct under investigation, thus enabling the United
28 States to further establish and prove each element or alternatively, to exclude the innocent

1 from further suspicion. In my training and experience, information stored within a
2 computer or storage media (*e.g.*, registry information, communications, images and
3 movies, transactional information, records of session times and durations, Internet
4 history, and anti-virus, spyware, and malware detection programs) can indicate who has
5 used or controlled the computer or storage media. This “user attribution” evidence is
6 analogous to the search of “indicia of occupancy” while executing a search warrant at a
7 residence. The existence or absence of anti-virus, spyware, and malware detection
8 programs may indicate whether the computer was remotely accessed, thus inculcating or
9 exculpating the computer owner. Further computer and storage media activity can
10 indicate how and when the computer or storage media was accessed or used. For
11 example, as described herein, computers typically contain information that log computer
12 activity associated with user accounts and electronic storage media connected with the
13 computer. Such information allows investigators to understand the chronological context
14 of computer or electronic storage media access, use, and events relating to the crime
15 under investigation. Additionally, some information stored within a computer or
16 electronic storage media may provide crucial evidence relating to the physical location of
17 other evidence and the suspect. For example, images stored on a computer may both
18 show a particular location and have geolocation information incorporated into its file
19 data. Such file data typically also contains information indicating when the file or image
20 was created. The existence of such image files, along with external device connection
21 logs, may also indicate the presence of additional electronic storage media (*e.g.*, a digital
22 camera or cellular phone with an incorporated camera). The geographic and timeline
23 information described herein may either inculcate or exculpate the computer user.
24 Lastly, information stored within a computer may provide relevant insight into the
25 computer user’s state of mind as it relates to the offense under investigation. For
26 example, information within the computer may indicate the owner’s motive and intent to
27 commit the crime (*e.g.*, Internet searches indicating criminal planning), or consciousness
28 of guilt (*e.g.*, running a “wiping” program to destroy evidence on the computer or

1 password protecting/encrypting such evidence in an effort to conceal it from law
2 enforcement).

3 i. A person with appropriate familiarity with how a computer works
4 can, after examining this forensic evidence in its proper content, draw conclusions about
5 how computers were used, the purpose of their use, who used them, and when.

6 j. The process of identifying the exact files, blocks, registry entries,
7 logs, or other forms of forensic evidence on a storage medium that are necessary to draw
8 an accurate conclusion is a dynamic process. While it is possible to specify in advance
9 the records to be sought, computer evidence is not always data that can be merely
10 reviewed by a review team and passed along to investigators. Whether data stored on a
11 computer is evidence may depend on other information stored on the computer and the
12 application of knowledge about how a computer behaves. Therefore, contextual
13 information necessary to understand other evidence also falls within the scope of the
14 warrant.

15 k. Further, in finding evidence of how a computer was used, the
16 purpose of its use, who used it, and when, sometimes it is necessary to establish that a
17 particular thing is not present on a storage medium. For example, the presence or
18 absence of counter-forensic programs or anti-virus programs (and associated data) may
19 be relevant to establishing a user's intent.

20 l. In most cases, a thorough search of a premises for information that
21 might be stored on digital storage media or other digital devices often requires the seizure
22 of the digital devices and digital storage media for later off-site review consistent with the
23 warrant. In lieu of removing storage media from the premises, it is sometimes possible to
24 make an image copy of storage media. Generally speaking, imaging is the taking of a
25 complete electronic copy of the digital media's data, including all hidden sectors and
26 deleted files. Either seizure or imaging is often necessary to ensure the accuracy and
27 completeness of data recorded on the storage media, and to prevent the loss of the data
28 either from accidental or intentional destruction. This is true because of the following:

1 m. *The time required for an examination.* As noted above, not all
2 evidence takes the form of documents and files that can be easily viewed on site.
3 Analyzing evidence of how a computer has been used, what it has been used for, and who
4 has used it requires considerable time, and taking that much time on premises could be
5 unreasonable. As explained above, because the warrant calls for forensic electronic
6 evidence, it is exceedingly likely that it will be necessary to thoroughly examine storage
7 media to obtain evidence. Storage media can store a large volume of information.
8 Reviewing that information for things described in the warrant can take weeks or months,
9 depending on the volume of data stored, and would be impractical and invasive to
10 attempt on-site.

11 n. *Technical requirements.* Computers can be configured in several
12 different ways, featuring a variety of different operating systems, application software,
13 and configurations. Therefore, searching them sometimes requires tools or knowledge
14 that might not be present on the search site. The vast array of computer hardware and
15 software available makes it difficult to know before a search what tools or knowledge
16 will be required to analyze the system and its data on-site. However, taking the storage
17 media off-site and reviewing it in a controlled environment will allow its examination
18 with the proper tools and knowledge.

19 o. *Variety of forms of electronic media.* Records sought under this
20 warrant could be stored in a variety of storage media formats that may require off-site
21 reviewing with specialized forensic tools.

22 47. Searching computer systems is a highly technical process that requires
23 specific expertise and specialized equipment. There are so many types of computer
24 hardware and software in use today that it is rarely possible to bring to the search site all
25 the necessary technical manuals and specialized equipment necessary to consult with
26 computer personnel who have expertise in the type of computer, operating system, or
27 software application being searched.
28

1 48. The analysis of computer systems and storage media often relies on
2 rigorous procedures designed to maintain the integrity of the evidence and to recover
3 “hidden,” mislabeled, deceptively named, erased, compressed, encrypted or password-
4 protected data, while reducing the likelihood of inadvertent or intentional loss or
5 modification of data. A controlled environment such as a laboratory, is typically required
6 to conduct such an analysis properly.

7 49. The volume of data stored on many computer systems and storage devices
8 will typically be so large that it will be highly impracticable to search for data during the
9 execution of the physical search of the premises. The hard drives commonly included in
10 desktop and laptop computers are capable of storing millions of pages of text.

11 50. A search of digital devices for evidence described in Attachment B may
12 require a range of data analysis techniques. In some cases, agents may recover evidence
13 with carefully targeted searches to locate evidence without requirement of a manual
14 search through unrelated materials that may be commingled with criminal evidence.
15 Agents may be able to execute a “keyword” search that searches through the files stored
16 in a digital device for special terms that appear only in the materials covered by the
17 warrant. Or, agents may be able to locate the materials covered by looking for a
18 particular directory or name. However, in other cases, such techniques may not yield the
19 evidence described in the warrant. Individuals may mislabel or hide files and directories;
20 encode communications to avoid using keywords; attempt to delete files to evade
21 detection; or take other steps designed to hide information from law enforcement
22 searches for information.

23 51. The search procedure of any digital device seized may include the
24 following on-site techniques to seize the evidence authorized in Attachment B:


25 a. On-site triage of computer systems to determine what, if any,
26 peripheral devices or digital storage units have been connected to such computer systems,
27 a preliminary scan of images files contained on such systems and digital storage devices
28 to help identify any other relevant evidence or co-conspirators.

1 b. On-site copying and analysis of volatile memory, which is usually
2 lost if a computer is powered down and may contain information about how the computer
3 is being used, by whom, when and may contain information about encryption, virtual
4 machines, or stenography which will be lost if the computer is powered down.


5 c. On-site forensic imaging of any computers may be necessary for
6 computers or devices that may be partially or fully encrypted in order to preserve
7 unencrypted data that may, if not immediately imaged on-scene become encrypted and
8 accordingly become unavailable for any examination.

9 **CONCLUSION**

10 52. Based on the information set forth herein, there is probable cause to search
11 the above-described **SUBJECT PREMISES**, the person of TRI HIEN DUONG, the
12 backpack used by TRI HIEN DUONG, and the **SUBJECT VEHICLE**, as further
13 described in Attachments A-1 through A-4, for evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities, as
14 further described in Attachment B, of crimes committed by the individual listed in this
15 affidavit and their coconspirators, specifically distribution of, and possession of, with
16 intent to distribute, controlled substances, in violation of Title 21, United States Code,
17 Section 841(a)(1).

18
19 
20 CASEY J. SNYDER
21 Special Agent
22 USPS OIG

23 The above-named agent provided a sworn statement to the truth of the foregoing
24 affidavit by telephone on the 26th day of May, 2021.

25 
26
27 BRIAN A. TSUCHIDA
28 United States Magistrate Judge

ATTACHMENT A-1**Place to Be Searched (SUBJECT PREMISES)**

The place to be searched is 15103 SE Newport Way, Bellevue, WA 98006, a one-story structure located on the south side of SE Newport Way. The house is blue in color with red and white trim. The entry door is located approximately at the middle of the house and is white in color. The numbers “15103” are located to the left of the front door to the residence.

The search is to include all storage areas associated with the premises, such as on-site storage lockers, detached storage sheds, and parking stalls, or safes; and any digital device(s) or other electronic storage media.



ATTACHMENT A-2

Person to Be Searched


This warrant authorizes the search of the person of TRI HIEN DUONG, DOB 11/22/1987 and the **SUBJECT PREMISES**.



ATTACHMENT A-3

Property to Be Searched (Backpack)

This warrant authorizes the search of a **BACKPACK** regularly used by TRI
DUONG, and the **SUBJECT PREMISES**.



ATTACHMENT A-4

Vehicle to Be Searched (SUBJECT VEHICLE)

This warrant authorizes the search of a red, 2021, Acura RDX, bearing Washington license plate BWP2727; and VIN: 5J8TC2H57ML014595 and the **SUBJECT PREMISES.**



ATTACHMENT B

List of Items to Be Seized

Evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Distribution of and Possession with Intent to Distribute Controlled Substances), involving TRI DUONG, as follows:

1. Controlled Substances: Including but not limited to methamphetamine, fentanyl, cocaine, crack cocaine, heroin, hashish, marijuana, MDMA, methadone, oxycodone, Oxycontin, Suboxone, Clonazepam, Alprazolam, Xanax, and Adderall;

2. Drug Paraphernalia: Items used, or to be used, to store, process, package, use, and/or distribute controlled substances, such as plastic bags, DVD cases, cutting agents, scales, measuring equipment, vials, pill presses, Mylar bags, heat/vacuum sealers, tape, duffel bags, chemicals or items used to test the purity and/or quality of controlled substances, and similar items;

3. Drug Transaction Records: Documents such as ledgers, receipts, notes, and similar items relating to the acquisition, transportation, and distribution of controlled substances;

4. Customer and Supplier Information: Items identifying drug customers and drug suppliers, such as telephone records, personal address books, correspondence, diaries, calendars, notes with phone numbers and names, "pay/owe" sheets with drug amounts and prices, maps or directions, and similar items;

5. Cash and Financial Records: Currency and financial records, including bank records, safe deposit box records and keys, credit card records, bills, receipts, tax returns, vehicle documents, and similar items; and other records that show income and expenditures, net worth, money transfers, wire transmittals, negotiable instruments, bank drafts, cashier's checks, and similar items, and money counters;

6. Photographs/Surveillance: Photographs, video tapes, digital cameras, surveillance cameras and associated hardware/storage devices, and similar items, depicting property occupants, friends and relatives of the property occupants, or suspected buyers or sellers of controlled substances, controlled substances or other contraband, weapons, and assets derived from the distribution of controlled substances;

7. Weapons: Including but not limited to firearms, magazines, ammunition, and body armor;

1 8. Codes: Evidence of codes used in the distribution of controlled substances,
2 including passwords, code books, cypher or decryption keys, usernames and/or
3 credentials for dark web marketplaces, and similar information;

4 9. Property Records: Deeds, contracts, escrow documents, mortgage
5 documents, rental documents, and other evidence relating to the purchase, ownership,
6 rental, income, expenses, or control of the premises, and similar records of other property
7 owned or rented;

8 10. Indicia of occupancy, residency, and/or ownership of assets including,
9 utility and telephone bills, canceled envelopes, rental records or payment receipts, leases,
10 mortgage statements, and other documents;

11 11. Evidence of Storage Unit Rental or Access: Rental and payment records,
12 keys and codes, pamphlets, contracts, contact information, directions, passwords or other
13 documents relating to storage units;

14 12. Evidence of Personal Property Ownership: Registration information,
15 ownership documents, or other evidence of ownership of property including, but not
16 limited to vehicles, vessels, boats, airplanes, jet skis, all-terrain vehicles, RVs, and
17 personal property; evidence of international or domestic travel, hotel/motel stays, and any
18 other evidence of unexplained wealth;

19 13. Individual and business financial books, records, receipts, notes, ledgers,
20 diaries, journals, and all records relating to income, profit, expenditures, or losses, such
21 as:

22 a. Employment records: paychecks or stubs, lists and accounts of
23 employee payrolls, records of employment tax withholdings and contributions, dividends,
24 stock certificates, and compensation to officers.

25 b. Savings accounts: statements, ledger cards, deposit tickets, register
26 records, wire transfer records, correspondence, and withdrawal slips.

27 c. Checking accounts: statements, canceled checks, deposit tickets,
28 credit/debit documents, wire transfer documents, correspondence, and register records.

 d. Loan Accounts: financial statements and loan applications for all
loans applied for, notes, loan repayment records, and mortgage loan records.

 e. Collection accounts: statements and other records.

1 f. Certificates of deposit: applications, purchase documents, and
2 statements of accounts.

3 g. Credit card accounts: credit cards, monthly statements, and receipts
4 of use.

5 h. Receipts and records related to gambling wins and losses, or any
6 other contest winnings.

7 i. Insurance: policies, statements, bills, and claim-related documents.

8 j. Financial records: profit and loss statements, financial statements,
9 receipts, balance sheets, accounting work papers, any receipts showing purchases made,
10 both business and personal, receipts showing charitable contributions, and income and
expense ledgers.

11 14. All bearer bonds, letters of credit, money drafts, money orders, cashier's
12 checks, travelers checks, Treasury checks, bank checks, passbooks, bank drafts, money
13 wrappers, stored value cards, and other forms of financial remuneration evidencing the
14 obtaining, secreting, transfer, and/or concealment of assets and/or expenditures of money;

15 15. All Western Union and/or Money Gram documents and other documents
16 evidencing domestic or international wire transfers, money orders, official checks,
17 cashier's checks, or other negotiable interests that can be purchased with cash, to include
applications, payment records, money orders, frequent customer cards, etc;

18 16. Negotiable instruments, jewelry, precious metals, financial instruments, and
19 other negotiable instruments;

20 17. Documents reflecting the source, receipt, transfer, control, ownership, and
21 disposition of United States and/or foreign currency;

22 18. Correspondence, papers, records, and any other items showing employment
23 or lack of employment;

24 19. Telephone books, and/or address books, facsimile machines, any papers
25 reflecting names, addresses, telephone numbers, pager numbers, cellular telephone
26 numbers, facsimile, and/or telex numbers, telephone records and bills relating to co-
27 conspirators, sources of supply, customers, financial institutions, and other individuals or
28 businesses with whom a financial relationship exists. Also, telephone answering devices
that record telephone conversations and the tapes therein for messages left for or by co-

1 conspirators for the delivery or purchase of controlled substances or laundering of drug
2 proceeds;

3 20. Safes and locked storage containers, and the contents thereof which are
4 otherwise described in this document;

5 21. Tools: Tools that may be used to open hidden compartments in vehicles,
6 paint, bonding agents, magnets, or other items that may be used to open/close said
7 compartments;

8 22. Any and all mailing documents and packaging materials related to U.S.
9 Postal Service, UPS, and FedEx, including but not limited to USPS Express Mail labels,
10 express mail and priority envelopes, first class mailings, receipts for USPS packages, and
11 tracking information;

12 23. Any records or information pertaining to the dark web and dark web
13 marketplaces, including the Empire Market, Deep Sea Market, and White House Market;

14 24. Any records or information pertaining to darknet monikers;

15 25. Cryptocurrency applications and wallets, including information regarding
16 current account balance and transaction history, i.e., date, time, amount, an address of the
17 sender/recipient of a cryptocurrency transaction maintained in such wallets;

18 26. Any records or information reflecting cryptocurrencies, including web
19 history, and documents showing the location, source, and timing of acquisition of any
20 cryptocurrencies, including wallets, wallet addresses, and seed phrases;

21 27. Any and all cryptocurrency, to include the following: (a) any and all
22 representations of cryptocurrency public keys or addresses, whether in electronic or
23 physical format; (b) any and all representations of cryptocurrency private keys, whether
24 in electronic or physical format; and (c) any and all representations of cryptocurrency
25 wallets or their constitutive parts, whether in electronic or physical format, to include
26 "recovery seeds" and "root keys" which may be used to regenerate a wallet.

27 a. The United States is authorized to seize any and all cryptocurrency
28 by transferring the full account balance in each wallet to a public cryptocurrency address
controlled by the United States.

b. The United States is also authorized to use the above-described
recovery seeds and root keys to reconstitute and/or regenerate any associated

1 cryptocurrency wallet and to seize any and all cryptocurrency stored in, or accessible via,
2 such wallet by transferring the full account balance to a public cryptocurrency address
3 controlled by the United States;

4 28. Cell Phones: Cellular telephones and other communications devices may be
5 seized, and searched for the following items:

6 a. Assigned number and identifying telephone serial number (ESN,
7 MIN, IMSI, or IMEI);

8 b. Stored list of recent received, sent, and missed calls;

9 c. Stored contact information;

10 d. Stored photographs of narcotics, currency, firearms or other
11 weapons, evidence of suspected criminal activity, and/or the user of the phone and/or co-
12 conspirators, including any embedded GPS data associated with these photographs;

13 e. Stored text messages, as well as any messages in any internet
14 messaging apps, including but not limited to Facebook Messenger, iMessage, Wickr,
15 Telegram, Signal, WhatsApp, Kik, and similar messaging applications, related to the
16 aforementioned crimes of investigation or that may show the user of the phone and/or
co-conspirators, including Apple iMessages, Blackberry Messenger messages or other
similar messaging services where the data is stored on the telephone;

17 f. Any Tor applications and records for Tor activity, including browser
18 history and “bookmarked” or “favorite” web pages;

19 g. Digital currency applications and wallets, to include information
20 regarding current account balance and transaction history, i.e., date, time, amount, an
21 address of the sender/recipient of a digital currency transaction maintained in such
wallets;

22 h. Stored documents, notes, and files that contain passwords/or
23 encryption keys;

24 i. PGP applications, to include stored private and/or public keys;

25 j. Any records or information related to darknet monikers; and
26

27 29. Digital devices, such as computers, and other electronic storage media,
28 such as USBs and Trezor devices, may be seized, and searched for the following items:

1 a. Evidence of who used, owned, or controlled the digital device or
2 other electronic storage media at the time the things described in this warrant were
3 created, edited, deleted, such as logs, registry entries, configuration files, saved
4 usernames and passwords, documents, browsing history, user profiles, email, email
5 contacts, "chats," instant messaging logs, photographs, and correspondence;

6 b. Evidence of software that would allow others to control the digital
7 device or other electronic storage media, such as viruses, Trojan horses, and other forms
8 of malicious software, as well as evidence of the presence or absence of security software
9 designed to detect malicious software;

10 c. Evidence of the lack of such malicious software;

11 d. Evidence of the attachment to the digital device of other storage
12 devices or similar containers for electronic evidence;

13 e. Evidence of counter-forensic programs (and associated data) that are
14 designed to eliminate data from the digital device or other electronic storage media;

15 f. Evidence of the times the digital device or other electronic storage
16 media was used;

17 g. Passwords, encryption keys, and other access devices that may be
18 necessary to access the digital device or other electronic storage media;

19 h. Contextual information necessary to understand the evidence
20 described in this attachment;

21 i. Records or information pertaining to the dark web and dark web
22 marketplaces, including the Empire Market.

23 j. Any records or information pertaining to darknet monikers;

24 k. Any records or information pertaining to Tor;

25 l. Any records or information pertaining to mnemonic phrases;

26 m. Any records or information reflecting cryptocurrencies, including
27 web history, and documents showing the location, source, and timing of acquisition of
28 any cryptocurrencies, to include wallets, wallet addresses, and seed phrases; and

1 n. Any records or information pertaining to PGP applications, to
2 include private and/or public keys.

3 THE SEIZURE OF DIGITAL DEVICES IS AUTHORIZED FOR THE PURPOSE OF
4 CONDUCTING OFF-SITE EXAMINATION OF THEIR CONTENTS FOR
5 EVIDENCE, INSTRUMENTALITIES, OR FRUITS OF THE AFOREMENTIONED
6 CRIMES.
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